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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Plaintiffs Clinton County Commissioners and Against the 
Incinerator Remediation, Inc. (AIR) brought this suit against 
the United States Environmental Protection Association 
(EPA) to enjoin EPA from proceeding with a trial burn and 
incineration remedy at the Drake Chemical Company site in 
Lock Haven, Pennsylvania. Plaintiffs allege that the 
incineration remedy would violate multiple federal 
environmental laws because it would release ultra-toxic 
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substances into the air and thereby cause irreparable harm 
to nearby land and residents. 
 
The district court dismissed plaintiffs' suit for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the judicial 
review provisions of the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 
precluded the court from exercising jurisdiction, under any 
federal law, until EPA's remedial activities at the site are 
completed. The court also concluded that it lacked 
jurisdiction to review EPA's actions under Leedom v. Kyne, 
358 U.S. 184 (1958), and that its failure to exercise 
jurisdiction did not deprive plaintiffs of any constitutional 
right of access to the courts. A panel of this court, 
considering itself bound by the earlier decision in United 
States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 
1994), reversed and remanded the case for further 
proceedings. However, the panel recommended that the 
case be heard in banc so that the full court could 
reconsider Princeton Gamma-Tech. Having granted 
rehearing in banc, we will now overrule that portion of 
Princeton Gamma-Tech on which plaintiffs rely and affirm 
the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' suit for lack of 




A chemical manufacturing facility operated on the Drake 
Chemical site from the 1940s to 1982, leaving soils and 
sludges, chemical storage tanks and wastewater lagoons 
highly contaminated with a variety of toxic contaminants 
considered hazardous to human health and the 
environment. In 1982, EPA took over the site and instituted 
clean-up efforts pursuant to its response authority under 
CERCLA. In 1988, EPA decided, after notice and an 
opportunity for public comment, to remediate the site by 
excavating the contaminated soils, treating them with an 
on-site mobile incinerator, and placing the treated soils 
back onto the site. The incineration contract was awarded 
in September 1993. 
 
The first step in the implementation of the incineration 
remedy involves a "trial burn" in which site soils are fed 
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into the incinerator and data is gathered to (1) verify that 
the incinerator will meet performance standards, (2) 
determine appropriate operating requirements, and (3) 
evaluate the potential risks from operation of the 
incinerator and determine whether the remedy should 
proceed. Prior to conducting the trial burn at the Drake 
site, EPA agreed, at the request of the public, to conduct a 
risk assessment to determine the potential health risks 
from the trial burn itself. It released the risk assessments 
to the public, held a public meeting, responded to written 
comments concerning the assessments, and then, in 
January 1996, instructed the contractor to proceed with 
the trial burn. 
 
On February 1, 1996, the Commissioners and AIR filed a 
complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 9659, the citizen suit provision 
of CERCLA, seeking to enjoin the trial burn and 
incineration remedy from proceeding. Plaintiffs alleged that 
the planned incineration (both the trial burn and the full 
incineration project) would result in the emission into the 
air of dangerous amounts of highly toxic chemicals that 
would contaminate the local air, soil, and food chain, 
creating an unacceptable risk of cancer and other serious 
illnesses. The complaint alleged in five counts that the 
incineration would violate the hazardous waste disposal 
requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act (RCRA), EPA's mandate under CERCLA to protect 
public health and the environment, and certain 
requirements imposed by the National Environmental Policy 
Act (NEPA). 
 
The district court ordered EPA to keep the incinerator 
shut down until a decision could be reached on plaintiffs' 
motion for a preliminary injunction. Early in March, as the 
district court was conducting an evidentiary hearing on the 
motion, EPA apparently admitted that there were some 
problems with its health risk assessment, sought a 
continuance of the hearing until it could correct those 
problems, and agreed to keep the incinerator shut down in 
the meantime. The agreement was memorialized in a 
Consent Order. 
 
Before the resumption of the preliminary injunction 
hearing but after the jurisdictional issue had been briefed 
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by the parties, the district court dismissed plaintiffs' 
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court 
held that (1) CERCLA's "timing of review" provision 
precluded the court from exercising jurisdiction over a 
citizens' suit challenging an EPA remedial action prior to 
the completion of the action and (2) that the citizen suit 
provision of CERCLA was the exclusive remedy available to 
plaintiffs and precluded the court from predicating 
jurisdiction on RCRA or NEPA. Plaintiffs filed a motion for 
reconsideration. The district court denied the motion, 
rejecting the plaintiffs' contentions that (1) the court had 
independent jurisdiction to review the EPA actions at the 
Drake site because those actions were clearly in excess of 
EPA's authority and (2) dismissal of the complaint violated 
plaintiffs' constitutional right of access to the courts. 




Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, 
a plaintiff may invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court only 
pursuant to a statutory grant of authority to adjudicate the 
asserted claim. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 
U.S. 375, 377 (1994); In re Morrissey, 717 F.2d 100, 102 
(3d Cir. 1983). Moreover, when the plaintiff seeks to sue the 
United States or an instrumentality thereof, he may not rely 
on the general federal question jurisdiction of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331, but must identify a specific statutory provision that 
waives the government's sovereign immunity from suit. See 
United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). A 
waiver of immunity must be "unequivocally expressed," 
United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33 (1992) 
(quoting United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 
(1980)), and is "construed strictly in favor of the sovereign." 
Id. (quoting McMahon v. United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 
(1951)). 
 
Plaintiffs here argue that there are four grounds for the 
district court's exercising subject matter jurisdiction over 
their complaint: (1) 42 U.S.C. § 9659 confers jurisdiction, 
despite 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h), because the complaint makes 
bona fide allegations of irreparable harm to public health or 
the environment; (2) if 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h) precludes the 
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court from exercising jurisdiction, it must be set aside 
when irreparable harm is alleged in order to effectuate 
plaintiffs' constitutional right of access to the courts at a 
meaningful time; (3) the citizen suit provision of RCRA 
confers jurisdiction; and (4) the district court had 
jurisdiction to review EPA's actions in remediating the 
Drake Chemical site under Leedom v. Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 
(1958), because the challenged actions are in excess of 
EPA's authority. We hold that none of these alternatives 





Plaintiffs point first to the citizen suit provision of 
CERCLA as the source of the district court's subject matter 
jurisdiction over their claims against EPA. Section 
9659(a)(2) of CERCLA, as amended, provides: 
 
Except as provided in subsections (d) and (e) of this 
section [relating to notice] and in section 9613(h) of 
this title (relating to timing of judicial review), 
any person may commence a civil action on his own 
behalf-- ... 
 
 (2) against the President or any other officer of the 
United States (including the Administrator of the 
Environmental Protection Agency and the 
Administrator of the ATSDR) where there is alleged a 
failure of the President or of such other officer to 
perform any act or duty under this chapter ... which is 
not discretionary with the President or such officer. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9659(a)(2). According to its terms, the scope of 
the cause of action authorized by the section is limited by 
§ 9613(h), "relating to timing of judicial review," which 
provides, in part: 
 
No Federal court shall have jurisdiction under Federal 
law ... to review any challenges to removal or remedial 
action selected under section 9604 of this title, ... in 
any action except one of the following: ... 
 
 (4) An action under section 9659 of this title (relating 
to citizens suits) alleging that the removal or remedial 
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action taken under section 9604 of this title or secured 
under section 9606 of this title was in violation of any 
requirement of this chapter. Such an action may not be 
brought with regard to a removal where a remedial 
action is to be undertaken at the site. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4) (emphasis added). 
 
The district court held that Congress's description of 
§ 9613(h) as "relating to timing of judicial review" and its 
use of the past tense in § 9613(h)(4) indicate that Congress 
intended to authorize federal court challenges to remedial 
action under CERCLA's response provision only after the 
remedial action has been completed. Accordingly, the court 
found that because plaintiffs' complaint was filed well 
before the completion of EPA's remedial action at the Drake 
Chemical site, § 9613(h)(4) expressly deprived the court of 
jurisdiction to entertain the portion of plaintiffs' complaint 
alleging that EPA violated CERCLA's requirements for 
selection and implementation of cleanup remedies. 
 
Plaintiffs argue on appeal that the district court erred in 
failing to recognize an exception to § 9613(h)(4) when a 
citizens' suit is grounded in bona fide allegations of 
irreparable harm to public health or the environment. See 
United States v. Princeton Gamma-Tech, Inc., 31 F.3d 138, 
148-49 (3d Cir. 1994). Based on our independent review of 
the text of § 9613(h)(4), its legislative history and the 
caselaw interpreting it, we agree with the district court and 
hold that Congress intended to preclude all citizens' suits 
against EPA remedial actions under CERCLA until such 
actions are complete, regardless of the harm that the 
actions might allegedly cause. 
 
We begin, as we must when interpreting a statutory 
provision, with the plain language of the statute. See New 
Rock Asset Partners, L.P. v. Preferred Entity Advancements, 
Inc., 101 F.3d 1492, 1498 (3d Cir. 1996); Smith v. Fidelity 
Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 909 (3d Cir. 1990). 
Section 9613(h)(4) expressly states that the citizen suit 
exception to the preclusion of federal court jurisdiction over 
challenges to EPA removal or remedial actions applies only 
to review of actions that have been "taken." Given that the 
subsection specifically deals with the "timing of review," we 
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find Congress's use of the past tense significant, and a 
clear indication of its intention that citizen-initiated review 
of EPA removal or remedial actions take place only after 
such actions are complete. 
 
This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that the 
opening sentence of § 9613(h), which establishes the 
general preclusion of federal court jurisdiction, prohibits 
review of any challenge to a remedial action "selected" 
under § 9604, while the exception allows for review in 
citizens' suits alleging that actions "taken" under § 9604 
were in violation of CERCLA. Because the exception is 
presumably more narrow than the prohibition, a remedial 
action "taken" must be something other than a remedial 
action "selected." We think that the most reasonable 
distinction between the two terms is that a remedial action 
"selected," which federal courts have no jurisdiction to 
review, is one chosen but not fully implemented, while a 
remedial action "taken," which a federal court may review 
for compliance with the requirements of CERCLA, is one 
that was chosen and has been completed. 
 
We also find the last sentence of § 9613(h)(4) supportive 
of our interpretation of the statute. According to that 
sentence, "an action may not be brought with regard to a 
removal where a remedial action is to be undertaken at the 
site." 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h)(4) (emphasis added). A "removal" 
action is an action taken in the short term to "prevent, 
minimize, or mitigate damage" to public health or the 
environment from the release or threatened release of a 
hazardous substance, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(23), while a 
"remedial" action involves a "permanent remedy taken 
instead of or in addition to removal actions" to contain a 
hazardous substance and minimize harm to public health 
and the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(24). Thus, EPA may 
take both "removal" and "remedial" actions at the same site 
with respect to the same "release" of hazardous materials. 
The concluding sentence of § 9613(h)(4) provides that in 
such situations a citizens' suit challenging a "removal" 
action may not be brought even after completion of that 
removal action, so long as "remedial" action remains "to be 
undertaken." This provision demonstrates beyond 
peradventure, we believe, that Congress intended to 
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preclude any judicial involvement in EPA removal and 
remedial actions until after such actions are complete. 
 
Although our conclusion that the statutory language is 
clear means that we need not consult legislative history, 
see Darby v. Cisneros, 509 U.S. 137, 147 (1993); Dresser 
Indus., Inc. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 106 F.3d 
494, 497 (3d Cir. 1997), we do so and find that that history 
supports our conclusion that Congress enacted § 9613(h) to 
prevent judicial interference, however well-intentioned, from 
hindering EPA's efforts to promptly remediate sites that 
present significant danger to public health and the 
environment. For example, the Conference Report on the 
Superfund Amendments of 1986 provides that 
 
[i]n new section [9613(h)(4)] of the substitute, the 
phrase "removal or remedial action taken" is not 
intended to preclude judicial review until the total 
response action is finished if the response action 
proceeds in distinct and separate stages. Rather an 
action ... would lie following completion of each distinct 
and separable phase of the cleanup.... Any challenge 
under this provision to a completed stage of a response 
action shall not interfere with those stages of the 
response action which have not been completed. 
 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 224 (1986), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3317 (emphasis added). This 
language clearly indicates that Congress intended to 
preclude judicial review of response actions or portions 
thereof that are ongoing, i.e. "have not been completed." 
 
Similarly, the Report of the House Committee on Energy 
and Commerce commented that § 9613(h) codified the 
established principle that "there is no right of judicial 
review of the Administrator's selection and implementation 
of response actions until after the response action [sic] have 
been completed to their completion." H.R. Rep. No. 99- 
253(I), at 81 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 
2863; see also H.R. Rep. No. 99-253(III), at 22 (1985), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038, 3045 ("[T]he Judiciary 
Committee amendment reaffirms that, in the absence of a 
government enforcement action, judicial review of the 
selection of a response action should generally be 
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postponed until after the response action is taken.").1 The 
Report of the House Committee on Public Works and 
Transportation explained the rationale for precluding all 
judicial review until after completion of remedial actions: 
 
The purpose of [§ 9613(h)] is to ensure that there will 
be no delays associated with a legal challenge of the 
particular removal or remedial action selected under 
section [9604] or secured ... under section [9606]. 
Without such a provision, responses to releases or 
threatened releases of hazardous substances could be 
unduly delayed, thereby exacerbating the threat of 
damage to human health or the environment. A 
person's rights to challenge the choice of removal or 
remedial action are preserved, however, and can be 
exercised ... [through] a citizen suit alleging that the 
removal or remedial action was in violation of any 
requirement of the Act .... 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 99-253(V), at 25-26 (1985), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3148-49 (emphasis added). 
 
Were we to adopt the plaintiffs' interpretation of 
§ 9613(h)(4) and permit judicial review of EPA remedial 
actions before completion whenever a challenge includes 
bona fide allegations of irreparable harm to public health or 
the environment, we would undermine Congress's clearly 
expressed intent because we would create a situation in 
which response actions could be seriously delayed while 
EPA refutes allegations of irreparable harm which, while 
"bona fide," may simply reflect a legitimate difference of 
opinion about the preferred remedy for a particular site. 
Congress clearly intended that such differences of opinion 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The Judiciary Committee proposed an amendment that would have 
allowed citizens to "seek review of remedial actions (not removal actions) 
during construction and implementation of such actions when a specific 
remedial measure that has been constructed is allegedly in violation of 
a requirement of this Act." The provision would not have allowed a 
challenge to the selection of the remedy, but only to its implementation. 
Id. at 23, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3046. The fact that Congress 
did not enact the Judiciary Committee's proposed amendment 
demonstrates its commitment to preventing all judicial interference with 
remedial actions. 
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be communicated directly to EPA during the pre- 
remediation public notice and comment period, not 
expressed in court on the eve of the commencement of a 
selected remedy.2 
 
The courts of appeals of the Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and 
Eleventh Circuits have read §§ 9613(h)(4) and 9659(a)(2) in 
the same way as we today read it. Each of these courts of 
appeals has held that these sections do not permit district 
courts to exercise jurisdiction over citizen suits challenging 
incomplete EPA remedial actions even where impending 
irreparable harm is alleged. Schalk v. Reilly, 900 F.2d 1091, 
1095-96 (7th Cir. 1990); Arkansas Peace Ctr. v. Arkansas 
Dep't of Pollution Control & Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212 (8th Cir. 
1993); Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 
F.3d 1469, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995); Alabama v. United States 
Envtl. Protection Agency, 871 F.2d 1548, 1557 (11th Cir. 
1989). 
 
The majority in Princeton Gamma-Tech rejected this 
"absolute" reading of § 9613(h)(4) because it found that a 
complete prohibition of judicial review of citizens' suits that 
allege irreparable harm to public health and the 
environment was "contrary to the objectives of CERCLA," 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In Princeton Gamma-Tech, we noted the existence of some support in 
the legislative history for the plaintiffs' interpretation of section 
9613(h)(4), that judicial review of incomplete EPA remedial actions is 
permitted whenever a challenge includes bonafide allegations of 
irreparable harm to public health or the environment. 31 F.3d at 145-46. 
In this regard, Senator Stafford remarked: 
 
 It is crucial, if it is at all possible, to maintain citizens' rights to 
challenge response actions, or final cleanup plans, before such 
plans are implemented even in part because otherwise the response 
could proceed in violation of the law and waste millions of dollars of 
Superfund money before a court has considered the illegality. . . . 
[C]itizens asserting a true public health or environmental interest in 
the response cannot obtain adequate relief if an inadequate cleanup 
is allowed to proceed. . . . 
 
132 Cong. Rec. 28,409. Similar statements by Rep. Roe, Senator 
Mitchell, and Rep. Florio can also be found in the Congressional record. 
See id. at 29,754; 28,429 and 29,741. Notwithstanding these conflicting 
views, Congress weighed public policy and chose the elaborate pre- 
remediation public review and comment procedures over judicial review. 
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31 F.3d at 148, and "ma[de] the citizens' suit provision an 
absurdity." Id. We are less convinced than was the 
Princeton Gamma-Tech majority, however, that the absolute 
limitation on judicial review established by § 9614(h)(4) is 
either absurd or "contrary to the objectives of CERCLA." 
First, EPA removal and remedial actions are designed to 
deal with situations involving grave and immediate danger 
to the public welfare. As we have noted, Congress 
apparently concluded that delays caused by citizen suit 
challenges posed a greater risk to the public welfare than 
the risk of EPA error in the selection of methods of 
remediation. Second, while Congress limited judicial review 
through § 9613(h), it did not thereby exclude the public 
from playing a role in ensuring that EPA actions under 
CERCLA are consistent with the objectives of the statute. 
Instead, Congress made the policy choice to substitute 
elaborate pre-remediation public review and comment 
procedures, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 9617; 40 C.F.R. pt. 300, for 
judicial review. In addition, it gave the states, as 
representatives of the public, a significant role in the 
enforcement, in federal court, of the substantive standards 
established for remedial actions. See 42 U.S.C. § 9621(e)(2). 
Finally, Congress apparently left citizens the option of 
obtaining relief in state court nuisance actions. See H.R. 
Conf. Rep. No. 99-962, at 224 (1986), reprinted in 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3317 ("New section [9613(h)] is not 
intended to affect in any way the rights of persons to bring 
nuisance actions under State law with respect to releases 
or threatened releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, 
or contaminants."). Finally, even if we perceived an 
arguable tension between our reading and the objectives of 
CERCLA, our conclusion would not be altered. When 
statutory language is as clear as it is here, "it is simply not 
[the] function [of] a reviewing court to act as a super- 
legislature and second-guess the policy choices that 
Congress made." Princeton Gamma-Tech., 31 F.3d at 153 
(Nygaard, J., concurring). 
 
Because we find that the plain language and legislative 
history of § 9613(h)(4) compel the conclusion that Congress 
intended to prohibit federal courts from exercising subject 
matter jurisdiction over all citizens' suits challenging 
incomplete EPA remedial actions under CERCLA, we will 
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overrule that portion of Princeton Gamma-Tech which held 
that a district court has jurisdiction under § 9613(h)(4) 
during the pendency of an EPA remedial action when 
plaintiffs make bona fide allegations of irreparable harm. 
Accordingly, we hold that the district court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction under CERCLA's citizen suit provision to 
entertain plaintiffs' challenge to EPA's implementation of 





Plaintiffs next contend that if § 9613(h)(4) precludes the 
district court from exercising jurisdiction over their suit, 
then the provision constitutes, in the circumstances 
present here, an unconstitutional impediment to their right 
of access to the courts at a meaningful time. Plaintiffs 
characterize the issue presented by their constitutional 
argument as "whether the Constitution provides for judicial 
review of agency actions that threaten to take the very lives 
of Plaintiffs at a time when such harm may still be 
prevented (a meaningful time), notwithstanding statutory 
limitations on judicial review such as those in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 9613(h)." Appellant's Brief at 27. Plaintiffs argue that the 
Constitution requires such review when there has been a 
"considerable showing of threatened irreparable harm and 
illegality," because at that point "there is no legitimate 
government interest in protecting the illegal and dangerous 
agency conduct from judicial action." Id. at 28-29. 
 
We find plaintiffs' constitutional argument unpersuasive 
because it is inconsistent with established principles of 
sovereign immunity. Because EPA is an instrumentality of 
the federal government, it is entitled to sovereign immunity 
from suit. That being the case, Congress is absolutely free 
to limit the extent to which it consents to suit against the 
EPA. See, e.g., Maricopa County, Ariz. v. Valley Nat'l Bank 
of Phoenix, 318 U.S. 357, 362 (1943) ("[T]he power to 
withdraw the privilege of suing the United States or its 
instrumentalities knows no limitations."); Lynch v. United 
States, 292 U.S. 571, 581 (1934) ("[C]onsent to sue the 
United States is a privilege accorded, not the grant of a 
property interest protected by the Fifth Amendment. The 
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consent may be withdrawn ...."); Heller v. United States, 
776 F.2d 92, 98 (3d Cir. 1985) ("Congress' power to remove 
a right to sue the government is absolute.... Thus, statutes 
either denying or withdrawing judicial remedies against the 
United States in respect to claims against it are 
constitutional.") (internal quotations and citations omitted); 
Susquehanna Valley Alliance v. Three Mile Island Nuclear 
Reactor, 619 F.2d 231, 245 (3d Cir. 1980) ("Congress can, 
of course, limit the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal 
courts, and can relegate some matters to the exclusive 
jurisdiction of an administrative agency. It can also prohibit 
private enforcement of federal statutes."). Under this well- 
recognized principle of sovereign immunity, plaintiffs 
cannot claim that they have a constitutional right to sue 
EPA in federal district court simply because they allege that 
an incineration remedy to be taken by EPA may cause 
irreparable harm. Thus, we hold that plaintiffs are not 
excused from the jurisdictional limitations imposed by 




Plaintiffs further argue that the district court has 
jurisdiction under the citizen suit provision of RCRA to hear 
their claims that the Drake Chemical site remedial activity 
will violate the hazardous waste treatment and disposal 
standards of RCRA. RCRA's citizen suit provision provides: 
 
Except as provided in subsection (b) or (c) of this 
section, any person may commence a civil action on 
his own behalf-- ... 
 
 (1)(B) against any person, including the United States 
and any other governmental instrumentality or agency, 
to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment to 
the Constitution, and including any ... past or present 
owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal 
facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to 
the past or present handling, storage, treatment, 
transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous 
waste which may present an imminent and substantial 
endangerment to health or the environment. 
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42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B). Plaintiffs asserted three claims 
under this provision, alleging that the Drake Chemical site 
incineration remedy was inconsistent with RCRA's disposal 
requirements and posed an "imminent and substantial 
endangerment" to public health and the environment.3 The 
district court held that it was precluded from entertaining 
plaintiffs' RCRA claims by § 9613(h), which deprives the 
federal courts of jurisdiction "to review any challenges to 
removal or remedial action selected under section 9604." 42 
U.S.C. § 9613(h) (emphasis added). Because the court 
found that the RCRA claims were brought to stop a 
remedial action selected under section 9604, it held that 
the claims constituted a challenge to a CERCLA action that 
could only be brought under one of the exceptions to 
§ 9613(h). Since the court had already held that the only 
asserted exception, § 9613(h)(4), was inapplicable, it 
dismissed the RCRA claims for lack of jurisdiction. 
 
In reaching its decision, the district court relied on 
Boarhead Corp. v. Erickson, in which we held that the 
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
plaintiff 's suit under the National Historic Preservation Act 
(NHPA) to stay EPA's CERCLA-related pre-cleanup activities 
on its historic farm. 923 F.2d 1011, 1013-14 (3d Cir. 1991). 
We found that the plain language of § 9613(h) precluded 
the exercise of jurisdiction over a challenge to an ongoing 
CERCLA removal or remedial action under any federal law: 
 
Congress could hardly have chosen clearer language to 
express its intent generally to deprive the district court 
of jurisdiction over claims based on other statutes 
when the EPA undertakes the clean-up of toxic wastes 
at a Superfund site. The sections begins: "No Federal 
court shall have jurisdiction under Federal law...." No 
language could be plainer. 
 
Id. at 1020; see also id. at 1023 ("CERCLA's timing of 
review procedures, as established in § [9613(h)], clearly 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Plaintiffs also alleged that the Drake Chemical site remediation 
activities violated NEPA and that the district court had jurisdiction over 
the NEPA claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. They do not challenge on 
appeal the district court's conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over the 
NEPA claims. 
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preclude jurisdiction to delay or interfere with EPA clean-up 
activities even if those activities could irreparably harm the 
archaeological or historical resources on Boarhead Farm."). 
Plaintiffs argue that Boarhead Corp. does not govern this 
case because it did not involve a RCRA suit. They urge this 
court to adopt the rationale of United States v. Colorado, 
990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), which they argue permits 
the prosecution of their RCRA claims despite the pendency 
of EPA's CERCLA remedial action. 
 
Plaintiffs are correct that the precise holding of Boarhead 
Corp. was that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
entertain a suit challenging CERCLA clean-up activities as 
inconsistent with the requirements imposed by NHPA, not 
RCRA. However, it is clear that the court's decision turned 
not on a finding that § 9613(h) specifically precluded NHPA 
suits, but on its conclusion that § 9613(h) precludes the 
federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over any 
challenge to a CERCLA action based on a violation of any 
other federal law: 
 
[O]ur resolution of this appeal depends upon the 
inability of the district court to entertain an action 
under the Preservation Act because § [9613(h)] of 
CERCLA deprives it of the power to hear claims under 
the Preservation Act, or any other statute, that would 
interfere with EPA's clean-up activities on a Superfund 
site. 
 
923 F.2d at 1024 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1013-14 
("The plain language of CERCLA § [9613(h)] shows that 
Congress intended to deny the district courts jurisdiction to 
hear complaints challenging the EPA's Superfund clean-up 
or pre-clean-up activities, even if a statute other then 
CERCLA ordinarily would create a federal claim.") 
(emphasis added). Thus, even though Boarhead Corp. did 
not precisely address the question at issue here, its 
reasoning is clearly applicable.4 Indeed, the case has been 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Our conclusion that the reasoning of Boarhead Corp. applies to RCRA 
suits challenging CERCLA clean-up activities is buttressed by RCRA 
§ 6972(b)(2)(B), which provides: 
 
No action may be commenced under subsection (a)(1)(B) of this 
section if the Administrator, in order to restrain or abate acts or 
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relied on by other courts of appeals to support the 
conclusion that RCRA-based suits challenging CERCLA 
activities are precluded under § 9613(h). See, e.g., McClellan 
Ecological Seepage Situation v. Perry, 47 F.3d 325, 329 (9th 
Cir. 1995); Arkansas Peace Center v. Arkansas Dep't of 
Pollution Control & Ecology, 999 F.2d 1212, 1217 (8th Cir. 
1993). Accordingly, the district court is precluded under 
§ 9613(h) from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over 
plaintiffs' RCRA claims.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
conditions which may have contributed or are contributing to the 
activities which may present the alleged endangerment-- ... 
 
 (ii) is actually engaging in a removal action under section [9604] 
of [CERCLA] .... 
 
This provision indicates that Congress intended to preclude interference 
with CERCLA cleanup activities by actions predicated on RCRA 
violations. Although plaintiffs argue that the provision is not directly 
applicable here because the hazard they allege is the trial 
burn/incineration itself, not the hazardous waste disposal that prompted 
the Superfund action, the provision is still relevant as an indication of 
Congress's intent that RCRA actions not interfere with CERCLA 
remediations. 
 
5. Even if we did not find Boarhead Corp. controlling and looked to the 
case law of other circuits, United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565 (10th 
Cir. 1993), would not support the plaintiffs' position. The Colorado case 
involved efforts by the Colorado Department of Health to enforce the 
state's EPA-authorized RCRA equivalent, the Colorado Hazardous Waste 
Management Act (CHWMA), in connection with a hazardous waste 
treatment and disposal facility at which EPA and the Army were 
conducting a CERCLA remediation. In holding that the district court had 
jurisdiction to enforce Colorado's CHWMA, the Tenth Circuit 
acknowledged that § 9613(h) bars federal courts from exercising 
jurisdiction over a challenge to a CERCLA remedial action under any 
federal law. Id. at 1577. However, the court held that § 9613(h) does not 
bar jurisdiction over a suit to enforce RCRA regulations where the suit 
does not "challenge" the CERCLA remedy. In the case before it, the court 
found that Colorado's enforcement action was not a "challenge" to 
EPA/Army's CERCLA remedy because it did not seek to halt or delay the 
remedy, but merely to compel the Army to comply with CHWMA 
regulations during the course of the remediation. Id. at 1576. The court 
explicitly distinguished Boarhead Corp. on the ground, inter alia, that the 
Boarhead plaintiff, who sought to stay a CERCLA remedial action, clearly 
was "challenging" the CERCLA action. Id. at 1577. Likewise, plaintiffs 
here, who seek an order that EPA "immediately and permanently cease 
incineration at the Drake Chemical NPL site," App. at 17, clearly are 
"challenging" EPA's CERCLA remedial action at the Drake Chemical site. 
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D. 
 
Finally, plaintiffs contend that even if the district court 
lacks jurisdiction over their suit under both CERCLA and 
RCRA, it has inherent jurisdiction to review EPA's action at 
the Drake Chemical site under the doctrine of Leedom v. 
Kyne, 358 U.S. 184 (1958). Plaintiffs characterize that 
doctrine as authorizing judicial review of any agency action 
allegedly conducted in excess of agency authority or in 
violation of a clear statutory prohibition. In Kyne, a 
professional association petitioned the National Labor 
Relations Board (NLRB) for certification as the exclusive 
collective bargaining agent of nonsupervisory professional 
employees at a plant. A competing labor organization 
sought to intervene and include certain technical employees 
in the bargaining unit. The NLRB found that the technical 
employees were not professional employees, but 
nonetheless decided that nine of them should be included 
in the bargaining unit. The association asked the NLRB to 
take a vote of the professional employees pursuant to 
§ 9(b)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). That 
section provides that the NLRB "shall not ... decide that any 
unit is appropriate for [collective bargaining] purposes if 
such unit includes both professional employees and 
employees who are not professional employees unless a 
majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion 
in such unit." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(1). The NLRB refused to 
hold the vote, included the nonprofessional employees in 
the bargaining unit, and directed a bargaining unit election. 
 
Following the election and certification of a bargaining 
representative, the association filed suit to have the 
decision, election, and certification vacated on the ground 
that the NLRB's decision to include the nonprofessional 
employees was made in excess of its authority. The 
Supreme Court held that the district court had jurisdiction 
to entertain the suit. Even though the decision to certify the 
unit was not a "final order" ordinarily reviewable under the 
NLRA, the Court allowed the suit to proceed because the 
suit sought vacatur of an order made in excess of the 
NLRB's authority and contrary to a specific "clear and 
mandatory" prohibition in the NLRA. Id. at 188. The Court 
inferred from Congress's creation of an express statutory 
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"right" of professional employees not to be included in a 
bargaining unit with nonprofessional employees without 
their consent that Congress intended the right to be 
enforceable under the general jurisdiction of the district 
courts. Id. at 190. 
 
Subsequent cases have refined the Kyne doctrine. In 
Briscoe v. Bell, 432 U.S. 404 (1977), the Court held that 
jurisdiction to review agency action allegedly in excess of 
statutory authority cannot be inferred when language in the 
statute itself expressly forecloses judicial review. In Briscoe, 
Texas sued the United States Attorney General to challenge 
his determination that Texas was covered by the Voting 
Rights Act (VRA). The Supreme Court held that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction to address Texas's challenge to the 
Attorney General's determination. Although Texas alleged 
that the Attorney General had exceeded his authority in 
calculating the applicability of the VRA, the Court held that 
review of the determination was expressly precluded by 
§ 4(b) of the VRA, which provides that "a determination or 
certification of the Attorney General or of the Director of the 
Census under this section ... shall not be reviewable in any 
court ...." 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b). The Court found that 
complete preclusion of review was consistent with 
Congress's intention to "eradicate the blight of voting 
discrimination with all possible speed" by preventing 
judicial delays in implementation of the VRA. 432 U.S. at 
410. 
 
More recently, in Board of Governors v. MCorp Financial, 
Inc., 502 U.S. 32 (1991), the Court reiterated that a right to 
judicial review under Kyne may be inferred only if there is 
no clear statutory prohibition of such review. In MCorp, a 
bank holding company sought to enjoin administrative 
proceedings instituted against it by the Federal Reserve 
Board on the ground that the proceedings were in excess of 
the Board's authority. The Federal Institutions Supervisory 
Act (FISA) authorizes the Board to institute administrative 
proceedings against bank holding companies. Although 
FISA includes a comprehensive regime of judicial review of 
Board orders, it also provides that "except as otherwise 
provided in this section no court shall have jurisdiction to 
affect by injunction or otherwise the issuance or 
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enforcement of any notice or order under this section, or to 
review, modify, suspend, terminate, or set aside any such 
notice or order." 12 U.S.C. § 1818(i)(1). The Court 
recognized that "Kyne stands for the familiar proposition 
that `only upon a showing of "clear and convincing 
evidence" of a contrary legislative intent should the courts 
restrict access to judicial review,' " 502 U.S. at 44 (quoting 
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967)). It 
nevertheless found in FISA the "clear and convincing 
evidence that Congress intended to deny the District Court 
jurisdiction to review and enjoin the Board's ongoing 
administrative proceeding." Id. Thus, the district court had 
no jurisdiction to entertain the holding company's suit. 
 
Section 9613(h) provides "clear and convincing evidence," 
akin to that present in MCorp, that Congress intended to 
deny the district court jurisdiction to review EPA's ongoing 
remedial action. Such denial of judicial review is consistent 
with Congress's intention to permit EPA to eradicate 
environmental damage "with all possible speed" by 
preventing judicial delays in the implementation of remedial 
actions. See Briscoe, 432 U.S. at 410. Accordingly, we hold 
that the Kyne doctrine does not confer federal court 




In accordance with the foregoing, we conclude that the 
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
plaintiffs' suit to stop the Drake Chemical site incineration 
remedy, and we will affirm the dismissal of the complaint. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
 
                                20 
